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BAD NEWS AND GOOD NEWSt
by John W. Reed*
I have been asked to visit with you about some of my current interests
in the evidence field, in which I teach. When you invite an academic
lawyer to speak at your meeting, you obviously expect of him something
other than the latest hot tips on trial strategy and tactics, something other
than a speech entitled "Reflections on My Last Eleven Victories in
Court." Others can do that for you, probably at lunch-or, even better,
at cocktails, with the successes more impressive and the defeats more
forgivable under the influence of an ounce or two of alcohol.
Instead, you expect of me some analysis of doctrine or some explanation of trend or philosophy. The reason you do not expect more is that
you know that as an academician I deal with students and books rather
than clients and cases and that, therefore, I know relatively little about
the real world of trial practice. And, of course, you are right. The
American system of legal education has tended to separate the schools
from the bar. Although I believe that on the whole our schools do a good
job of preparing men and women for professional careers at the bar, I am
persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the schools would do a better
job if there were more cooperative efforts between the schools and the
bar. This is singularly true in the area of evidence and trial practice. If
you will indulge me a few more moments of this prologue, let me explain
why this is so.
Law schools do one thing superbly well: they teach the intellectual
skills of reasoning, of distinction drawing, of deductive and inductive
logic, of anlysis and synthesis. These are heavily verbal skills, at least
in the context in which lawyers employ them, and students are tested for
their mastery of these skills by written examinations. If one does well,
he or she is placed on the law review, where these particular skills are
honed even further.
The top ranking graduates (and, as an aside, four of the first five in
Michigan's last graduating class were women) usually go into large
firms or clerkships from which, in a few months or at most a few years,
they are drawn back to the academy to teach, most of them having never
tried a case and many of them having never dealt face to face with a
tAddress delivered at the Annual Convention of The International Society of Barristers,
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client. The faculties feel that the one solid objective criterion they can
measure and rely on in assessing potential new teachers is grades in law
school-in short, the ability to do well in the written evidence of analytical skills, excellence in which was the criterion by which the existing
faculty was chosen. Thus, the faculties repeat-replicate--themselves,
again and again.
A good argument can be made that high development of these logical
skills is antithetical to the development of creativity and persuasiveness,
the hallmarks of the superior barrister. Psychologists and psychiatrists
tell us as much. Whatever the theory, the fact remains that faculties hire
deucedly few teachers with aptitude for, much less experience in, trial
practice.
The schools need more people like Jim Carrigan, who was a pioneer
in clinical teaching of trial practice. Many schools, however, are inhospitable to teachers with that kind of interest, mostly because the existing
faculty members neither understand nor know how to assess those skills.
I have many problems with the Chief Justice's views about the quality of
the trial bar and what to do about it, but I agree that the law schools do
a better job in almost every other legal field than they do in the field of
litigation.
I do have one small suggestion to make, which, by a surprising coincidence, parallels a program I am engaged in. Indeed, it is the point of
this extended aside with which I have begun my remarks. It is true that
the typical law teacher is not really sophisticated about how litigation is
handled, from case intake through satisfaction of judgment or settlement.
But it is true also that most trial lawyers do not know how to organize
the concepts of a subject matter and lead students through it efficiently
and memorably. The obvious answer, it seems to me, is a joining of skills
and efforts. This past semester, an able Detroit lawyer, Richard Goodman, and I conducted a seminar at the University of Michigan Law
School that we called "Problems in Civil Litigation." The students read
a 2500-page transcript of a product liability case, and we worked on that
case for the entire semester Assigning the students various roles, we
re-examined most of the strategic and tactical decisions that were made,
as, for example, whom to sue, in what court, before what judge, and on
what theory. Pleadings were drawn, responded to, and criticized. Discovery approaches were considered, and interrogatories and responses
were prepared. Settlement possibilities were discussed. We brought in
some of the actual expert witnesses, who were examined and crossexamined by the students and then by Mr. Goodman. Adversary counsel
in the case came to one session, and his views on the case were compared
with ours.
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As you know, this is not an entirely novel approach to training for
trial practice, there being extended institutes around the country, notably
in Boulder, Chicago, and San Francisco; indeed, some of you are active
in these enterprises. But it is not being done in the schools very much,
again for the reason that there is scarcely a single full-time law teacher
capable of doing it. Team teaching, however, given a thoughtful and
able practitioner and a willing and (one hopes) able teacher, is superbly
successful. In more than twenty-five years of teaching, I have never had
a more responsive, enthusiastic group of students, and I learned more
than I like to admit (because of what it tells you about my ignorance
before). Moreover, Mr. Goodman, who gave of his time, enjoyed it
thoroughly. The experimental seminar was an exciting and resounding
success.
I tell you all of this by way of encouraging you to be alert to opportunities for similar collaborations in the law schools where you live. I know
that I must direct the larger part of my message at the schools, because
they, not you, tend to be the reluctant ones; but I do want you to know
of our seminar at Michigan and of the enthusiastic and affirmative response from all three parties-students, practitioner, and teacher. I urge
you to develop the acquaintance of the appropriate teacher and offer your
services in a similar enterprise. The trial bar of tomorrow will be the
better for it, and (as a not inconsequential by-product) you may have
some effect on the style of legal education in this country.
As for my principal topic, it was suggested that I deal with subject
matter in the field of evidence. That surely means the Federal Rules of
Evidence, the freshest evidence development around. The Conference
Committee version of the bill was passed by both houses of Congress on
the night of December 18, 1974. The President signed the bill on
January 2, and the rules will take effect on July 1, 1975. Copies of the
final bill are not yet available, but that is of little matter because I do not
intend to report and analyze individual rules. You will be doing that in
continuing legal education programs of one kind or another back home in
the months ahead. Rather, I want to put the new rules in perspective and
to suggest their implications for the future of trial practice and of the
adversary system.
First, let me refresh your recollections about the history of evidence
codification in the United States. Although some evidence rules are
generally statutory, for example, business records as evidence, some
privileges (doctor-patient, priest-penitent), and dead man statutes, there
has not been throughout our nation's history any significant codification
of the law of evidence except California's in the 19th Century. Our
evidence principles are essentially common law.
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In practice this has led to much diversity. Even in a given state, particular rules may be hard to ascertain. One Michigan judge says, only
slightly exaggerating, that he cannot find applicable rules and so he
simply keeps a copy of McCormick on his bench and rules accordingly.
(His practice recalls the instance of the judge who was discovered by
some lawyers at his bar to be ruling according to the "card method." At
the beginning of a case he would place a well shuffled deck of cards face
down on the bench and assign in his mind the color red to one party and
black to the other. Whenever an objection was made he would turn up
the next card and rule accordingly. A committee of the bar was appointed to call on the judge and remonstrate with him. He was embarrassed to have been found out and apologized, explaining that he
had not done very well in the law school evidence course, which was not
very good anyway. He agreed that his procedure was unfortunate and
promised to buy a copy of McCormick, keep it at hand, and rule accordingly. To show his good faith he tore up the deck of cards and threw
them in the wastebasket. The Committee members thanked him and
left with handshaking and bonhomie all around. A fortnight later, the
committee called on him again and presented him with a new deck of
cards.)
Other than the California experience with the Field Code of Evidence,
there was no important codification attempt until the 1930's, at the time
the American Law Institute was engaged in its orgy of restating the law.
Because of the heterogeneity of evidence rules and because of belief that
revision rather than clarification was called for, the ALI decided that a
model code was to be preferred to a restatement, and in 1942 it promulgated the Model Code of Evidence. The product of Professor Edmund
Morgan and a committee of distinguished teachers and appellate judges,
the Model Code was elegant and forwardlooking. It was, however,
adopted nowhere, primarily because it was thought to represent too dramatic a change from precedents. Some of its flaws probably stemmed
from the failure to include in the committee membership experienced
trial lawyers and trial judges.'
Later, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, concluding that the need for reform in the field of evidence remained, sought to produce rules that had a better chance of acceptance.
The resulting Uniform Rules of Evidence were promulgated by the Conference in 1953. These rules, produced by Professor McCormick of
Texas and a committee that included trial judges and lawyers, were more
modest in their changes. They made some headway, with a degree of
acceptance in states such as Kansas (the chairman of the drafting committee had been a Kansas trial judge), Utah, and New Jersey. The rules
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also generated considerable interest and discussion even where not
adopted, but codification and reform were still glacially slow.
In the 1960's the Judicial Conference of the United States recommended the development of rules of evidence for the federal courts. The Chief
Justice appointed an advisory committee, with Professor Edward Cleary,
then of Illinois and now of Arizona State, as reporter. The committee prepared and circulated several drafts of proposed rules. The final draft
was adopted and "prescribed" by the Supreme Court on November 20,
1972, with Mr. Justice Douglas dissenting on the ground that the Supreme Court does not have rule-making power in evidence matters.
Moreover, he said, in effect, "They're not ours," being the product of an
advisory committee. The rules were transmitted to Congress as required
by the Rules Enabling Act. In early 1973, however, Congress balked
and enacted a law that prevented the rules from becoming effective unless
and until Congress enacted them.
The House Judiciary Committee, in that pre-Watergate time, held
extensive hearings and produced a bill that made many changes from the
Supreme Court's version, almost all of them in the direction of conforming the new rules to existing practice. The House passed its version on
February 6, 1974, and the Senate then went to work. In October the
Senate Judiciary Committee reported out its version of the bill, which
was passed by the Senate in November. The differences from the House
bill were relatively few, but those differences tended to move back toward
the Supreme Court version-which is to say, restored some of the modest
reforms that would have been denied by the House version. The Conference Committee reached agreement on a statute close to the Senate version and on December 18, 1974, the law was passed, with President
Ford signing it on January 2.
It seems safe to predict that many states will follow suit in order to
have consistent practice between state and federal courts, even as they
have followed the lead of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Indeed,
some have jumped the gun, e.g., Wisconsin, which has already enacted
the Supreme Court version of the rules. My own state of Michigan is
launching a study of the desirability of adopting evidence rules identical
with or closely similar to the new Federal Rules of Evidence.
Now, during the years of this codification process, another development was taking place-a development with which you are all familiar.
I refer to the gradual but perceptible modification of the adversary system. I do not mean to over-dramatize the situation, but I think that a
legal historian some decades hence will perceive the post war years (and
I refer, of course, to World War II, our war) as a time of significant erosion of the adversary system. There has been an assimilation of some of
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the features of the Continental system of litigation, technically known as
inquisitorial in distinction to adversary. In that other system, as you
know, the judge plays a larger role than he does in traditional British and
American practice, and a much larger role than in American practice
from the Jacksonian era to about 1940.
During the last thirty-five years or so, we have seen a diminution of
adversariness in our courts. You know the changes as well as I:
(1) For example, the discovery and pretrial procedures
typified by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-the system
of laying almost all of one's cards on the table;
(2) For example, the widespread abolition of party voir
dire of jurors and the substituiton of voir dire from the bench
(and-a related development, I think-reduction in jury
size);
(3) For example, judicial management of complex litigation;
(4) For example, the apparently widespread tendency of
judges to increase the employment of their historic but little
used power to question, and even to call, witnesses.
Each of you can add illustrations of this trend better than I, because you
live with it week in and week out.
Of course, I do not laud everything about the adversary system, and
I certainly deplore its excesses where lawyer self-discipline is weak or
lacking. But I sincerely believe that in a world of imperfect men, a
world of non-angels, the application of contending forces is productive
of "truer" and more just determinations of controversies than is any
system dependent on magisterial wisdom and probity.
I recently conferred with a group of parole board members, their
hearing officers, and supporting staffs. They were trying to determine
what procedures to use in parole matters in order to comply with the
Supreme Court's landmark decision in Morrissey v. Brewer. They have
been performing their tasks under guidelines that seek to balance the
welfare of the individual prisoner and the security of the general public.
They have been doing so, however, with limited or no input from the
parolee or his counsel (if any), whereas the new standards will require a
considerable degree of adversariness, particularly in revocation hearings.
These good men and women have been doing their work honestly and
diligently; but when they explained to me how they arrive at their decisions as to whether the parolee has violated the terms of parole, I was
appalled by the extent to which in this nonadversary setting unchallenged
biases, illegitimate inferences, and paternalism apparently abound.
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The training and experience of most judges, of course, are a good cut
above the training and experience of parole board members and hearing
officers. But none of us-judge or no-is without prejudices and misconceptions, and all of us err. I submit that the surest way to confound
the error and to expose the prejudice is to subject all assumptions and
assertions to the scrutiny of someone with a contrary interest-in short,
an adversary.
Adversariness pits contending points of view against each other, and
point of view does make enormous difference. Perhaps you recall the
familiar illustration of the diary entries made by the young woman on a
Caribbean cruise. Her first day's entry said, "I met the Captain and I
believe he is interested in me." The next day's entry read: "The Captain
has asked me to have dinner with him in his cabin tomorrow night." The
third day's entry said: "I went to the Captain's cabin for dinner, and after
dinner he made advances to me and said that if I did not yield myself
to him, he would sink the ship. I saved all of the passengers and the
crew." Things do look different, depending on point of view.
It was quite possible that a modern code of evidence would carry
forward this diminution in the vigor of the adversary system. Indeed,
the ALI Model Code moved in that direction. But the new Federal Rules
are much more moderate in this regard, and it is here that we come to
the "bad news/good news" point of my topic. The bad news is that there
is a new statutory code of evidence whose dozens of rules-fifty pages in
the Senate draft-you and I are going to have to become familiar with.
Some of these rules represent no change whatever in existing law, but
others will significantly change the way you will try some lawsuits. That
means some retraining or retreading, which is hard work. That's the
bad news.
Now for the good news: the Federal Rules of Evidence are well within
the spirit of the adversary system. Because they codify the law and are
succinctly stated and readily available, they may indeed reverse any
existing trend toward giving the judge a free hand and letting the processes of proof slip further toward the inquisitorial method. In this regard,
they are "conservative" rules, and, in the true sense of that much abused
adjective, they conserve the process we now have. That's the good news.
Incidentally, to characterize the new rules as "conservative" is not to
praise them unreservedly. In some areas they "conserve" long-established
rules that probably were not very wise to begin with and have grown no
better with age. One is reminded of the analogous situation of the man
who was in his doctor's office for a physical examination. As the patient
stood against the wall stripped of his clothes, the doctor examined him
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carefully and began measuring his abdomen with a yardstick. In a
puzzled tone the doctor said:
"As near as I can tell, your navel is about five inches below where it
belongs. Have you had an operation?"
"No," said the patient.
"Well, maybe it's hereditary."
"No, I don't think so."
"Well, then, what do you attribute it to?"
"I don't know, unless it's that for twenty-three years I have been flagbearer in my lodge."
Indeed, to applaud the new rules as conservative is not to say that all
our existing rules are fine and dandy. Many are not, and the Federal
Rules change some of these, most for the better. Nor is it to say that I
am pleased with every single provision in the new Federal Rules. I think
certain ones are bad, and I am "underwhelmed" by the wisdom of some
others. But I applaud the project; I recognize the processes of political
and professional compromise that were necessary to get a set of rules at
all; and most of all, I am delighted that, in the field of evidence, the adversary assumptions have been strengthened on the whole, rather than
weakened. To me, and I suspect to you, that is good news.
I do not have time to speak of many of the specific rules, but let me
illustrate my thesis with mention of a few.
First, the rules that recognize in the judge considerable power to affect
the development of the case and the finding of facts are, on the whole,
merely continuations of practices well established, in federal courts at
least, and sometimes generally. I refer, for example, to Rule 403, which
authorizes the judge to exclude relevant evidence:
"if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
Rule 611 recognizes the authority of the court to:
"exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make
the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time,
and (3) protect witnesses from harrassment or undue embarrassment."
And Rule 102 states that:
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"These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to
the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings
justly determined."
These limit counsel's freedom to proceed as he might wish; but they are
certainly orthodox, and they are undoubtedly necessary limitations
on free enterprise in the courtroom.
Another illustration of continuing rules that limit what might be
called freedom of competition in the courtroom is the pair of rules
dealing with the court's power to call and interrogate witnesses, both
lay and expert. Surely no one doubts a judge's power either to call or to
question a witness; Rule 614 recognizes that power, but the committee
report significantly notes that appellate courts may still reverse when a
judge abandons his proper role as judge and assumes the role of advocate.
Even here there is a handy escape hatch for counsel: Rule 614 also
makes it explicit that counsel need not object to the judge's actions (in
calling or interrogating) until the jury "is not present." And Rule 706,
calling for court-appointed experts, merely continues the practice under
Rule 28 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and extends it to
civil cases-a power that exists, I take it, even without statute. Here too
there is an adversary protection: Rule 706 expressly says that nothing
in the rule limits the parties in calling expert witnesses of their own
selection.
In short, when the Federal Rules have provisions inhibiting full play of
the adversary system, they are merely codifications of well recognized
judicial prerogatives, not new encroachments. Even here, minor relief
has been granted as I have noted.
The other rules that have any policy bias on this issue come down
pretty much on the side of encouraging adversariness. Some seem tame
in the abstract, but a comparison of them with the Supreme Court's draft
discloses that Congress moved firmly in this direction. Let me offer five
illustrations:
Illustration 1: Rule 611 retains the classic federal rule limiting crossexamination to the subject matter of the direct, plus matters affecting
credibility, with the judge having discretion to permit coverage of additional matters as on direct. This is the advocate's rule, protecting his
order of presentation of proof. The Supreme Court draft, on the other
hand, had adopted the wide open rule-the judges' and law professors'
rule. Congress, by insisting on the present rule, opted for adversariness.
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Illustration 2: Rule 613 eliminates the requirement of a foundation
for proof of a prior inconsistent statement. You will recall that typically
it is necessary that counsel on cross-examination bring to the attention
of the witness with some specificity the time, place, and nature of the
allegedly inconsistent statement, as a condition of independent proof of
that inconsistent statement by counsel's own witness later. This tips
counsel's hand and makes difficult the exposure of the lying or wishywashy witness. The new rule merely requires that, in fairness, the witness
be afforded an opportunity at some point to explain or deny the allegedly
inconsistent statement. Obviously, that opportunity may be delayed until
after the inconsistency has been revealed. This is a pro-adversary rule.
Illustration 3: Rule 607 permits impeachment of one's own witness,
a procedure not allowed in many courts, including some federal. Perhaps
one might argue that prohibiting impeachment of one's own witness is
the "pro-adversary position," and that new Rule 607 moves away from
that. But I read it otherwise-as a freeing of counsel to protect his client
1
even against those whom he calls and who then disappoint.
Illustration 4: Surprisingly, the Congressional version eliminated a
rule proposed in the Supreme Court draft that sought to codify the practice followed by many federal judges of summing up and commenting
on the evidence. The House Judiciary Committee report noted that the
authority to comment on the weight of evidence and the credibility of
witnesses (an authority not granted to judges in most state courts) is
"highly controversial." After much debate, the Committee deleted the
rule and said that it intended "that its action be understood as reflecting
no conclusion as to the merits . . . and that the subject should be left
for separate consideration at another time." Until that "other time"
arrives, this lack of a provision on the point in an otherwise comprehensive evidence code seems to me to be strongly pro-adversary.
Illustration5: The treatment of the hearsay rule is the most important
illustration of all. The various proposals for reform of the law of evidence almost always have involved significant alterations to the hearsay
rule. In extreme form, these proposals suggested that hearsay should be
received for what it is worth, relying on the ability of jurors to assess
secondhand, uncross-examined narratives. Even the more moderate reforms proposed that the hearsay exceptions be replaced with a generic
principle of admitting hearsay that seemed reliable-"the kind of information on which reasonable people rely in the conduct of important
matters." It is fair to say that a major reason for the chill reception given
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some earlier reform efforts was the bar's distaste for these departures.
The Federal Rules, on the other hand, have retained the familiar pattern
of rejecting hearsay (rather traditionally defined) but admitting it if it
falls under one or more of numerous (about 30) exceptions. Some of
these exceptions are stated traditionally and others are modernized and
liberalized, but all have some foundation in case law. I do not have the
time here to speak of the rule and the exceptions individually except to
note that there are provisions authorizing the court to admit hearsay not
fitting precisely within the stated pigeonholes but having "equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" if certain general conditions
are met. In context this amorphous exception is not a major inroad on
the hearsay rule.
This treatment of hearsay in the Federal Rules is consistent with the
adversary philosophy and represents another anchor against a drift away.
That is so because the hearsay rule is a fundamental element of adversary
procedure. Although it is sometimes said that hearsay is objectionable
because it is typically second- or third-hand, with a danger of error in
reporting, and because it is not under oath (and there is some merit to
both of these contentions), the essential failing of hearsay evidence is
that the declarant's story is being placed before the jury in order to prove
the truth of that story without cross-examinationof the declarant by the
adversary. I think it no exaggeration to say that the hearsay rule is the
"enforcer" of the right of cross-examination. The hearsay rule and the
right of cross-examination are opposite sides of the same coin. Thus, a
diminution of the hearsay rule is pro tanto a diminution of the right of
cross-examination. In a litigation system that relies heavily on party
initiative and gives a party great latitude in deciding what material to
place before the court, the right of cross-examination is indispensable to
the search for truth. Hearsay evidence is excluded precisely because the
statement being offered to the jury for its belief or disbelief is uncrossexamined. The retaining of the essence of the hearsay rule is the clearest
indication of the pro-adversary character of the Federal Rules.
In short, I view the new Federal Rules of Evidence as marking, at the
very least, a pause in the process of weakening the adversary aspects of
our system of civil litigation. With their undoubted influence on state
practice, the rules suggest that, during our years at the bar in any event,
we shall continue to seek determinations of fact based on competing
presentations by adversaries, not upon magisterial inquests. To each of
you (and, I believe, to the public we are sworn to serve) that is indeed
good news.
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